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NEW INVESTMENT FUNDS, RESTRUCTURING, AND LABOR OUTCOMES: A 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question: This article considers the consequences for employment, work 
organisation, and industrial relations where companies are acquired by private equity, hedge 
funds, or sovereign wealth funds.  It also assesses the role of national labour regulation in 
moderating labor outcomes 
Research Findings: The article draws on three case studies – a Spanish supermarket chain, a 
German engineering company, and a ports and logistics group hitherto based in the UK.  
Employment reductions are found in each case, though to varying extents.  There are few 
changes in work organization but some developments in employee voice and representation.  
National systems of labour regulation do not impact substantially on employment reductions but 
they do affect the extent to which worker representatives receive information after (though not 
during) the acquisition.   
Theoretical Implications: Contrary to extant theory, the extent of national employment 
regulation does not appear to be an impediment to restructuring by investment funds.  The 
differential effect of the three funds suggests that the extent of ownership is not decisive in 
explaining the level of activism or its impacts on labor.  Instead, the objectives and time frames 
of funds appear to be more important.          
Policy Implications: The implication of the findings is that greater disclosure and regulation of 
new investment funds is more likely to enhance employee protection than further labor 
regulation.  Broadly, this has been the main thrust of recent policy within European Union 
institutions.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The activities of investment funds, such as private equity (PE), hedge funds (HF), and sovereign 
wealth funds (SWF), have been controversial in Europe and beyond, especially in relation to their 
effects on labor and employment.  On the one hand, European trade unions and the European 
Socialist Party group of parliamentarians have been major critics.  In a study of PE and HFs, the 
Socialist Party argued that funds threaten the viability of target companies, lead to employment 
reductions and wage cuts, put pensions at risk, and ignore employee voice (European Socialist Party, 
2008).  On the other hand, the European Venture Capital Association, representing PE funds, argues 
that PE is engaged in value creation rather than value destruction or value redistribution.  PE funds 
inject new investment and new management and, in the long-term, have a beneficial effect on 
employment and jobs in the companies which they acquire.  According to this view, the cases where 
PE has had adverse effects on employees are relatively few, but have attracted a disproportionate 
amount of publicity.  Moreover, these instances tend to be where target firms have been weak 
performers with poor prospects (European Venture Capital Association, 2008).  For their part, HFs 
make similar defences of their activities, arguing that activist involvement in firms is relatively rare, 
HFs bring liquidity to markets, and their higher returns lead to real benefit to workers, not least for the 
pension funds which invest in them (see for example the Alternative Investment Management 
Association material quoted in Gospel, Haves, Pendleton, Vitols, and Wilke, 2010: 88).    
This debate between protagonists has been mirrored by controversy among academics, at least 
in relation to PE.  Some large-scale US survey evidence has suggested that PE tends to be associated 
with job growth, at least in the medium term (World Economic Forum, 2010).  Similarly, surveys 
have found that on the whole there have been few changes in industrial relations institutions and 
procedures in PE buy-outs (Bacon et al., 2010).  Against this, there is evidence from more detailed 
cases of large-scale job loss, intensification of working practices, and a reduction in employee voice, 
including withdrawal of union recognition (Clark, 2009b).  Methodological considerations have a 
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substantial bearing on findings, with the more positive accounts of PE effects vulnerable to charges of 
respondent and survivor biases, whilst the more negative cases studies are questionable on grounds of 
their typicality and representativeness (Lutz and Achleitner, 2010).  More nuanced accounts suggest 
that PE funds are neither ‘angels nor demons’ (Lutz and Achleitner, 2010) and that there are variations 
in labor effects between sub-species of buy-outs (Wood and Wright, 2010).  Meanwhile, to our 
knowledge, there are no academic studies of the labor effects of HFs and SWFs.             
  This article contributes to these debates by examining the labor and employment effects in 
three companies acquired or invested in by these three types of investment funds.  Two main research 
questions are addressed.  First, to what extent, and in what ways, is labor affected by the intervention 
of investment funds?  Specifically, do fund interventions lead to employment change, modifications 
to work organization and working practices, and reductions or enhancement of employee voice and 
representation?  How far does the extent of labor and employment change correspond to the extent of 
ownership by these funds?  Second, does national labor regulation have a significant moderating 
effect on labor outcomes arising from fund interventions?  There are two aspects to this: does the 
extent of employment protection regulation affect the amount of employment change and how far do 
national systems of employee voice enable employees and their representatives to influence 
restructuring processes?   
The article draws on three case studies of firms which have been the subject of interventions 
by investment funds.  The first is a Spanish company acquired by a British PE fund; the second 
concerns a German company subject to intervention by a US HF; and the third involves a British 
company acquired by a Dubai SWF.  These company cases were developed from material researched 
for the European Commission by the present authors and later extended by them.  The cases were 
selected to provide a spread of investment fund types, with varying degrees of ownership.  In so far as 
this is possible with a small number of cases, they were selected to be representative of typical fund 
acquisitions rather than extreme or polar types.  In each case the target company was a large firm 
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operating in a mature industry, and which was to some extent under-performing or under-valued, but 
not in imminent danger of collapse.  On the one hand, significant organic growth was unlikely given 
the maturity of the sectors, and value gains could mainly be realized through restructuring.  On the 
other hand, these were not turnaround situations where radical changes were necessary to ensure 
survival.  To permit evaluation of the second set of research questions, a further factor in case 
selection was the need to include national industrial relations contexts with varying degrees of labor 
regulation.  We selected cases from a relatively unregulated labor context (the UK), from one where 
worker protection and representation has a well-developed legal form (Germany), and from one 
(Spain) where the employment relations system is said to take a hybrid or Latin form (Aguilera, 
2005).       
The findings from the cases suggest that the involvement of these funds does not 
automatically lead to either large job losses / job additions or deterioration / improvements in terms 
and conditions of employment at target companies.  Whilst overall headcount employment was 
reduced in the three cases, this was mainly achieved by transfers to other employers rather than lay-
offs, though, as will be discussed below, this is a significant consideration for employees.  It is 
notable that the largest reduction in employment was found in the case involving the HF, and in the 
national context where labour protection is most extensive.  In terms of work organization, there were 
no dramatic changes in the organization of labor, the intensity of work, and how jobs are performed in 
any of the cases.  As for industrial relations, it is striking that there was little involvement of 
employee representatives in information disclosure and consultation concerning the acquisition of 
shares or takeover of the company, despite well-developed employee voice systems in at least one of 
our cases.  However, the presence of a new owner did not subsequently led to substantial reductions 
in employee voice and representation.  Indeed in one case, employee voice institutions have been 
enhanced.   
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The cases generate interesting implications for extant governance and labor theory.  First, the 
extent of ownership by these investment funds is less important in influencing labor outcomes than the 
objectives and time horizons of the fund.  This is illustrated especially by the HF case where a 
relatively small ownership stake was nevertheless associated with substantial changes in some aspects 
of employment.  These changes emanated from a concern by the HF to transfer value to shareholders 
in a relatively short period of time.  Second, national systems of labor regulation do not appear to 
have a significant moderating effect on the extent of employment reductions and changes.  The 
largest fall in employment amongst our cases is found in a company operating in the most regulated 
national system.  Nor does the extent of national regulation on worker voice affect the amount of 
information and voice which is given to workers before and during the acquisition process.  
However, confirming earlier research, it does affect the extent to which worker representatives receive 
information after the acquisition (Bruining, Boselie, Wright, and Bacon, 2005; Bacon, Wright, 
Scholes, and Meuleman, 2010).   
This last point notwithstanding, our results have two major implications for policy and 
practice.  First, the extent of employment protection and representation regulation does not appear to 
be a major impediment to restructuring by these various investment funds.  Second, for those 
concerned about the employment consequences of fund interventions, greater regulation of the funds 
themselves (e.g. greater requirements to disclose information) might be more effective than further 
regulation on employment protection (Bacon et al., 2010).           
The paper is organized as follows.  In the following section, the nature, extent, and activities 
of the three types of investment funds are considered.  The next section then deals with purported 
links between funds and labor outcomes and provides a brief survey of the existing empirical 
literature.  These sections place the cases in context.  The following section outlines the research 
methods and presents evidence from the cases.  The final section discusses the implications of these 
findings for theory, further research, and policy discussions.   
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BACKGROUND: THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF INVESTMENT FUNDS 
Private Equity 
PE funds invite subscriptions from institutional investors and wealthy individuals to make 
investments in their funds.  These investors become partners and have their capital tied up for a 
period of time – usually the lifetime of the fund which typically runs for 10-12 years.  The fund 
managers (general partners) charge these investors (limited partners) an annual management fee 
(typically 2 per cent) and take a part (20 per cent) of the annual returns of the fund above a pre-
agreed hurdle rate payable to investors (so-called carried interest) (Gilligan and Wright, 2010).     
 This pooling of capital is used to acquire existing companies or subsidiaries, generally 
with a view to restructuring and developing their operations prior to a resale or stock-market 
flotation at some time in the future.  The most dramatic cases have been public-to-private 
transactions, whereby large listed companies are taken into private ownership (e.g. in Europe, 
Alliance Boots in the UK or Gambro in Sweden).  Typically, most of the purchase price is 
financed by debt, much of which is secured against the assets or income stream of the acquired 
company.  The remainder is contributed by the PE fund.  Funds, either singly or in conjunction 
with other funds, acquire target companies, usually in their entirety.  Unlike most institutional 
investors in equity markets (pension, insurance, and mutual funds), PE fund managers take an 
activist approach to their investee companies.  The top managers of these targets, sometimes 
newly installed by the PE house, are monitored closely and their incentives tied to the 
achievement of restructuring goals (Gilligan and Wright, 2010).  In this way the aim is to reduce 
the agency costs of ownership.  Nevertheless, there is some debate about the nature of the PE 
business model.  Some view it as primarily based on financial engineering whereby returns are 
mainly secured via leverage (Folkman, Froud, Williams, and Johal, 2009), whilst others see it as 
involving restructuring of under-performing firms to enhance performance (World Economic 
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Forum, 2008).  Both conceptions, but in particular the latter, have potentially important 
implications for labor and employment.             
A notable feature of PE funds is that they are relatively less regulated and typically have 
fewer obligations to disclose than other types of institutional investors.  As private companies, 
PE-owned businesses are also generally exempt from the corporate governance requirements 
faced by stock market-listed firms.  This lack of disclosure can present problems for employees 
and their representatives in responding to managerial restructuring initiatives.  It is also 
important to note that when PE takeovers are achieved through share transactions, they are not 
viewed as a change of control that would trigger employee rights to information and employment 
protection under present European Union legislation.         
 
Hedge funds 
HFs are usually identified by four characteristics: they are pooled, privately organized 
investment vehicles; they are not usually available to retail investors; they are administered by 
professional investment managers with performance-based pay and significant investments in the 
fund; and they operate largely outside of national securities regulation and registration 
requirements (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008: 1735).  As such, HFs are usually exempt 
from the requirement typically faced by pension funds and mutual funds to hold diversified 
portfolios.  As investment funds, they tend to be lightly regulated and have fewer obligations to 
disclose their activities than other types of investment fund.       
In terms of equity investments, a variety of strategies can be adopted by HFs, but the 
most important in the context of employment are directional and event driven strategies.  In the 
former, HFs seek margins by exploiting, and possibly even causing, market movements.  Short 
selling is a classic case of this.  In the latter, they secure returns through interventions in so-
called special situations such as mergers and takeovers.  Activism, where a fund takes an 
Page 7 of 39
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
   
8 
 
ownership stake and aims to influence management strategies and decisions, is one form of 
event-driven strategy.  Activist HFs are defined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development as ‘investment vehicles that seek, often through the exercise of voting power 
or the threat of it, to influence publicly held companies to take actions that the HF believes will 
increase the company’s value’ (OECD 2007: 8).  There are a relatively small number of activist 
HFs, accounting for about 5 per cent of total HF assets under investment and about a quarter of 
assets used for event-driven strategies (OECD, 2007: 22).         
Like PE, HF activism is aimed at strategic re-direction of target companies.  However, 
unlike PE, activist HFs rarely seek majority control, though they may build up sizeable stakes 
(Brav et al., 2008).  The primary objective of most interventions by activist HFs is to pressurise 
managers to increase returns to shareholders.  As such they usually rely on varying degrees of 
cooperation with the existing management and shareholders.  However, the most visible cases 
tend to be those where HFs contest the actions of incumbent managers.  US evidence suggests 
that HFs tend to focus more often on value transfers than changes to business and operating 
strategies (Klein and Zur, 2009).  Interventions are usually aimed at initiating cash dividends 
and share buy-backs, cutting top management pay, and securing board seats.  Again, US 
evidence indicates that activist HFs typically target under-valued, but nevertheless either well-
performing firms or those with good growth potential (Brav et al., 2008).   
   
Sovereign Wealth Funds 
SWFs are investment funds operated by governments or their agencies.  They are used by 
countries with large foreign reserves to obtain a higher rate of return on their assets by investing 
in international markets than would be available from government bonds or other investments in 
the home country (Sethi, 2008: 12).  The largest SWFs are based in the Gulf states and United 
Arab Emirates (e.g. Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Kuwait), Saudi Arabia , Singapore, Norway, and China.  
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SWFs have given rise to widespread concern because they enable overseas governments to 
acquire important stakes in companies in other countries, thereby offering the potential to exert 
strategic, but largely hidden, influence on other countries’ economies.  Overwhelmingly, they 
tend to be secretive about their holdings and strategies, being concerned not to reveal much 
about positions and being aware of charges of interference.  As a result, even less information 
tends to be disclosed by SWFs than by PE and HFs.     
  SWFs have traditionally taken a passive approach to their investments, allowing 
incumbent managements to remain in place and making few demands for changes in operations.   
They have typically also held minority stakes so as not to attract unwelcome attention in host 
countries.  However, there is some evidence that SWFs are beginning to take a more activist 
role, especially where they acquire majority stakes (Sethi, 2008: 13-17).  There are also a 
growing number of cases of where funds or their affiliates have acquired full control of 
companies.  In addition, SWFs are becoming increasingly involved with PE and HFs as both 
limited and general partners (Bortolotti, Fotak, Megginson, and Miracky, 2009).     
 
LINKS WITH LABOR OUTCOMES: RHETORIC, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 
Linkages   
The activities of investment funds may affect labor and employment in several ways.  First, new 
investment fund owners may affect corporate strategies. The acquisition of a sizeable proportion 
of shares or the total quantity of shares will enable the new investor to influence management 
strategies and decisions via the governance of the company.  Funds may pressurise managers to 
expand or contract the firm, to acquire or divest divisions and subsidiaries, and to pursue greater 
product market share and / or to maximise revenues.  In this sense the influence of investment 
funds on strategy is direct.  There may also be more indirect effects in so far as pressure on 
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companies to enhance returns to investors may lead managers to revise their business and 
corporate strategies.   
Second, new owners may affect time horizons.  As suggested earlier, HFs tend to have 
short-term, PE medium-term, and SWFs long-term time horizons.  The contrast then is with the 
time horizons of other owners, such as individuals and families, banks, and institutions such as 
mutual, pension, and insurance funds.  Shorter term horizons, with a high propensity to sell, 
may lead to higher pay-back demands and a disinclination to invest in longer-term, intangible 
assets, such as human resources.  In practice, this may affect job security and preparedness to 
invest in training.  It may also mean that investors with shorter-time horizons create 
mechanisms to intensify work and to obtain a quick return on human capital. 
Third, new owners may affect performance management in various ways. They may shift 
the balance between devices based on traditional commitments and ones based on monetary 
rewards. They may also shift the balance between performance targets based on production and 
service quality and targets based on financial returns.  Any such shift may then, for example, 
have implications for the use of different sorts of pay systems and pay structures down through 
the firm. 
Fourth, new owners may shift the balance in governance and voice systems within the 
firm. Thus, new owners may affect the weight of shareholder voice relative to other stakeholders.  
In terms of employee voice, they may shift the balance between one-to-one direct participation 
as opposed to representative and collective participation in the firm. Works councils and trade 
unions may be either favoured or disfavoured.  
The extent to which labor is affected by actions by these funds and their investee 
company is likely to be moderated by national regulatory institutions.  The capacity to reduce 
employment may be affected by employment protection regulation, whilst regulation on 
employee voice and representation is likely to affect the extent to which labor is informed and 
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consulted.  Some recent analysis of the impact of PE, for instance, suggests there is an overall 
negative effect on employment in the US and UK, but not in France, Spain, and Belgium 
(Boucly, Sraer and Thesmar, 2009; Lutz and Achleitner, 2010).  This leads the present authors 
to propose that national institutional contexts moderate the labor effects of these funds.     
Thus, there are various ways in which investment fund ownership may influence firm-
level management behavior and decision-making.  In turn, these may affect employment, work, 
and industrial relations, subject to the moderating effect of national labor regulation.  We now 
provide further details of the extant evidence for each type of fund intervention. 
 
Private Equity 
The case against PE mounted by trades unions and others is that PE transfers value from 
employees (and taxpayers) to the PE fund, its investors, and its managers.  First, initial 
restructuring of acquired companies may involve asset sales and closure of poorly performing 
units, leading to lay-offs.  Second, it is contended that the financial model operated by PE puts 
managers under powerful pressures to improve performance via control of free cash flow.  
Managers are also typically placed on powerful incentive contracts.  These sticks and carrots are 
said to encourage managers to seek rapid improvements to company performance, often by 
retrenchment and efficiency improvements, which may in turn have adverse effects on 
employees.  Further, financial engineering may also put employees’ pensions at risk because 
pension assets may be treated as collateral or, where they are a drain on the assets of the firm, 
sold off to third parties (European Socialist Party, 2008; Clark, 2009a).   
Much of the criticism of PE has focused on informational issues.  Employees and their 
representatives have complained that they do not know what is happening during takeovers.  
Moreover, in Europe, a particular issue with public-to-private transactions is that share-based 
transfers do not necessarily trigger employment protection and rights to information under 
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European Union legislation governing consultation during takeovers (European Socialist Party, 
2008).   
Counter arguments to these claims are that PE firms have a strong interest in value 
creation and that PE interventions can lead to employment growth and more secure employment 
in the longer term.  Those cases where PE activity has adverse effects on employees are said to 
be relatively few, but attract a disproportionate amount of publicity.  In any case, these instances 
tend to be where target firms are poor performers with weak prospects.  Thus, it is argued that 
restructuring would have taken place anyway even without investment fund intervention 
(European Venture Capital Association, 2008). 
The evidence on labor effects relating to these competing claims is mixed and to some 
extent linked to the methodologies used by researchers.  Case study evidence suggests that 
restructuring following PE takeovers has led to cuts in employment, reductions in wages and 
benefits, deterioration in working conditions, and reductions in employee voice (Clark, 2009b; 
Faber, 2006; Kaserer, Achleitner, von Einem and Schiereck, 2007; European Socialist Party, 
2008; Service Employees International Union, 2007).  There are also some large scale 
econometric studies which find reductions in employment, or smaller increases in employment 
than in comparable firms, especially in the immediate aftermath of PE transactions (World 
Economic Forum, 2008 and 2010; Acharya, Hahn and Kehoe, 2009).  Against this, other studies 
provide evidence of employment growth after PE takeovers (British Venture Capital 
Association, 2006; Cressy, Munari, and Malipiero, 2007; World Economic Forum, 2010).   
Some studies differentiate between management buy-outs (involving incumbent managers) and 
management buy-ins (involving more purely outside PE acquisitions) and find that the latter are 
more likely to have negative effects on employment (Amess and Wright, 2006).   
There is less evidence on the impact on wages and benefits, though again there are 
divergences in findings.  Some case studies highlight cuts in benefits in PE-owned companies 
Page 12 of 39
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
   
13 
 
(Faber, 2006).  Thornton (2007) and World Economic Forum, (2010) find that pay grows more 
slowly in PE-owned firms than in the wider economy.  Nevertheless, other research finds wages 
growth in the period immediately after the acquisition (Wright et al. 2007).  Amess and Wright 
(2007) find that average wages tend to be lower in PE-backed firms than in other firms, 
especially in buy-ins.  However the World Economic Forum (2010) study claims that average 
wages are higher in PE target firms prior to acquisition, but are reduced to the industry average 
post-acquisition.  Some evidence from the US indicates reductions in employer healthcare 
provision (Service Employees International Union, 2007).    
Whilst some PE-owned firms may reduce employment, they may produce better quality 
jobs.  For the UK, Bacon et al. (2004) and Bruining et al. (2005) present evidence that PE-
backed firms use a greater variety of high commitment work practices.  After the PE 
transaction, these firms increase the amount of employee involvement, flexible work practices, 
and skills training.  Similarly, Amess, Brown and Thompson (2007) find that workers in PE-
owned businesses have more discretion in their work practices than similar workers in non-PE 
firms.  Others, however, have argued that many of these new work practices take the form of 
‘hard’ or manipulative Human Resource Management and impose greater pressures on workers 
(Thornton, 2007).     
In terms of impacts on employee voice and representation, there is also diverse and 
conflicting evidence.  There are instances where PE-acquired companies no longer bargain with 
trade unions and have reduced employee voice (Evans and Habbard, 2008; Faber, 2006; 
International Trade Union Congress, 2007).  By contrast, in many instances, existing approaches 
continue more or less unchanged.  There are also instances where PE investment funds, as well 
as PE-backed businesses, choose to work closely with employee representatives (Westcott, 2009; 
Beeferman, 2009).  Indeed, in some cases, trade unions view PE positively because of its 
potential to rescue failing firms and because it may generate good returns to pension funds 
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(Beeferman, 2009).  One recent European Union-wide study has suggested that PE firms adapt 
to national systems of labor representation and that in most instances employee voice institutions 
tend to be left more or less untouched after buyouts (Bacon et al., 2010).      
 
Hedge Funds 
HFs may also affect employment and labor outcomes in a variety of ways.  As already stated, a 
key factor is that, unlike PE, activist HFs do not usually seek complete control of companies and 
the average duration of their investment is shorter.  Their attention is focused more on changing 
the behavior of existing managers.  In some cases they are concerned with encouraging 
managers to restructure (e.g. by selling non-core activities), whilst in others their attentions are 
more focused on directly transferring value to shareholders via share buybacks and increased 
dividend payments.   
The possible effects on labor and employment may be as follows.  Where HF activism is 
focused on encouraging managers to modify business strategies, such as withdrawal or 
curtailment of certain activities, there may be major effects on work and employment.  Where 
activism is aimed at diverting cash-flow from other stakeholders to shareholders, this may place 
restrictions on the resources available to reward labor within the firm.  Activism focused on 
securing governance changes, such as board representation and replacements of the chief 
executive, may lead to changes in company strategy, which may have effects on wages and 
employment.   
Unfortunately, there is very little evidence currently available on the labor effects of HFs.  
US studies of HF activism have been primarily concerned with examining the objectives of HFs 
and their effects on company performance (Brav et al, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009).  To date, 
there have been two European studies on labor effects conducted by the current authors for the 
European Commission (Wilke, Vitols, Haves, Gospel, and Voss, 2009; Gospel et al., 2010).  
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There are also some brief case studies in a report prepared by the Socialist Group in the 
European Parliament (European Socialist Party, 2008).  
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds 
SWFs have tended to be passive investors, despite their often substantial ownership stakes in 
investee companies.  This suggests that their effects on management behavior may be limited 
and that there will be little impact on labor and employment.  This may be reinforced by the 
desire of SWFs to stay out of the limelight.  However, their investment may affect labor in 
various ways.  On the one hand, it may help maintain employment in struggling firms and create 
new opportunities for growth.  This may also have subsequent beneficial effects on wages and 
conditions within companies.  They may also be prepared to continue supporting pension funds 
where previous owners may not.  On the other hand, in pursuit of good returns, SWF investors 
may pressure firms to restructure and sell off parts of their operations and concentrate on core 
activities.  It should be remembered also that most SWFs do not come from countries where 
employee rights and trade union bargaining are strong and this may make them impatient of 
labor voice.  On balance, we expect that the employment consequences of SWF investment will 
be less strong than PE or HFs, due to the political constraints on their activities and their usually 
passive interest in the companies in which they invest.  
However, to date, there has been only two studies of the labor effects of SWF activity.  
This was conducted by the current authors for the European Commission, and it was found that 
there was evidence of transfers of employment and job loss through restructuring.  However, 
there had been little effect on wages and conditions or on employee voice (Wilke et al. 2009; 
Gospel et al., 2010). 
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RESEARCH METHODS 
The research was undertaken drawing on case studies of companies affected by each type of 
investment fund.  The purpose of the case studies was to generate data on labor effects, and thus to 
contribute to the development and refinement of theory on the links between investment fund activity 
and aspects of employment, taking into account the potential moderating factors of national labor and 
employment regulation.  The source of these cases was a database, created by the European 
Commission, of all major PE, HF, and SWF acquisitions and interventions in Europe (further details 
can be found in Voss, Vitols, Wilke, and Haves, 2009).  The cases selected provide examples of the 
three different types of funds, operating in three of the largest European economies (Wilke et al., 
2009).  The PE and SWF cases involved 100 per cent acquisitions whereas the HF acquired a 
minority (9 per cent) stake.  The size of the PE and HF acquisitions are typical whereas the SWF case 
is an example of a hitherto less common, but fast growing, level of ownership.   
A variety of principles may be adopted to guide case selection (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Here the 
concern was to focus on typical rather than polar cases.  This is because the debates on the merits of 
investment funds, PE especially, have tended to highlight either dramatic restructuring and 
employment reduction or growth stories in expanding industries.  This has tended to inhibit or a full 
assessment of the effects of these funds and the development of theory on finance-labour linkages.  
Our cases are typical of the companies selected for intervention by the various funds.  All were to 
some extent under-performing or under-valued companies, but were not in imminent danger of 
collapse.  Restructuring was likely to occur in each case, but was not likely to be a battle for survival.  
In addition, it was important to select companies which had been affected at a sufficient time in the 
past so as to distinguish permanent from temporary effects.  
The first case deals with a Spanish supermarket company (DinoSol) acquired by a British PE 
fund (Permira) from a larger listed Dutch company.  Retail is the largest single area of PE 
acquisitions (World Economic Forum, 2008), partly because store groups often have valuable 
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property portfolios and partly because cash-flow tends to be positive (i.e. income is received before 
expenses paid for many product lines).  DinoSol was divested from a larger group: acquisition of 
divisions is the largest single type of PE acquisition activity (World Economic Forum, 2008 ibid.).  
The second case concerns a German company (Kuka), the target of intervention by a US HF (Wyser-
Pratte).  Kuka is typical of the substantial number of firms in Germany and elsewhere which have 
been the subject of HF interventions (Bessler and Holler, 2008; Brav et al, 2008): although profitable 
at the time, it was believed to be under-valued and had a large free float of shares.  The third case is 
of a British company (P&O), acquired by a Dubai SWF.  This case represents a growing trend 
amongst SWFs to acquire large stakes in firms and industries of strategic importance to the parent 
country of the SWF.  The cases are summarized in Table 1.    
To consider the moderating effects of labor regulation, a further structuring dimension in case 
study selection was national labor relations context.  We therefore selected our company cases from a 
liberal market economy (the UK), a coordinated market economy (Germany), and one where 
employment relations takes a hybrid or Latin form (Spain).  Two dimensions of industrial relations 
context are important.  One is employment protection, the other is worker voice and representation.  
The UK is at the bottom of European countries on the Employment Protection Index of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, whilst Germany and Spain are in the 
upper half of countries (OECD, 2004).  Spain is known for especially well-developed employment 
protection, deriving from state paternalism from the Franco era.  As for worker voice, Germany has 
well-developed statutory procedures for worker voice, involving representation in works councils and 
on company boards.  Spain too has an extensive system of works councils, though traditionally these 
bodies have not been involved in workplace restructuring and they lack the codetermination rights 
possessed by German works councils.  In the UK there are various statutory rights to information and 
consultation, but works councils as such are rare, especially outside of larger firms, and unions have 
become weak in the private sector.   
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-------------------------------------    
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
In each case, semi-structured interviews were carried out through the spring of 2009 
using a common questionnaire.  Interviews were held with the following: DinoSol (interview 
with head of Finance, head of Human Relations, two other managers; three union 
representatives, one union consultant; Permira denied access); Kuka (interview with G. Wyser-
Pratte himself and one staff member; interviews with three management representatives; two 
trade union representatives one of whom was a member of the supervisory board); P&O 
(interviews with senior Human Resources representative; five union full-time officers; three 
union lay representatives; two representatives of specialist maritime consultancy firms; but not 
the fund, which denied access).  In each case, primary documents (company reports, trade union 
reports, some private materials passed on by representatives) and secondary material (web 
materials, newspaper, and trade journals) were examined.  These materials exist in longer case 
studies held in a project case study archive and would be available on request (Wilke et al., 
2009).   
We analysed the effects on three interconnected areas covering a range of labor outcomes 
(Gospel, 1992).  First, employment relations deal with the arrangements governing such aspects 
of employment as job security, rewards, and benefit systems.  Second, work relations are taken 
to cover the way work is organized and the deployment of workers around technologies and 
production or service systems, including training.  Third, industrial relations are taken to cover 
the voice aspirations of workers and institutional arrangements which may arise to address them, 
such as joint consultation, works councils, trade unions, and collective bargaining.   
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DinoSol: Spanish supermarket, British private equity fund 
DinoSol is Spain’s sixth largest supermarket group, concentrated primarily in the South.  Until 
2004, the company was owned by the Dutch-listed Ahold Group.  However, when the latter got 
into difficulties and its share price fell in late 2004, Permira – one of the largest British PE 
houses – acquired the company.  To date, DinoSol has been Permira’s largest Spanish 
acquisition.  The purchase price was said to be €895m, which was around half of what Ahold 
had paid for the company a few years earlier from the Spanish group, Hiplodiplo.  At the time of 
the Permira purchase, it should be noted that not only the parent company, but also DinoSol 
itself, were in some difficulty.  It was widely felt that the company needed to be restructured to 
compete in an increasingly competitive market.  At the time of acquisition, DinoSol employed 
11,000 workers. 
In line with the PE model, Permira made it clear that the intention was to take DinoSol 
private, to hold it for five to six years, to restructure it, and then to refloat it at a profit.  The 
business plan has been to dispose of stores where the company is weak, to reinforce investments 
in geographical areas where it is strong, and to strengthen overall operational activity.  
There has been little change in top management personnel in DinoSol and board 
membership has not been significantly altered.  In Spain, Permira has a small group of 
managers, one of whom is a retailing specialist, hired at the time of the DinoSol acquisition.  
This individual attends DinoSol board meetings.  As suggested to us by management 
interviewees, Permira lays down broad financial and strategic parameters and then leaves it to 
DinoSol management to develop these operationally.   
According to company management respondents, strategy and operations have developed 
in the following way since Permira acquired the company.  In the first place, DinoSol began a 
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sell-and-lease-back programme for some stores, thus freeing up immediate cash for Permira.  In 
early 2006, the company took on additional debt and in early 2007 a dividend of €484m was paid 
to Permira.  As will be seen, a small number of stores and offices were closed.  Also, some 
stores were sold in geographical areas where the company was deemed to be weak or where a 
good opportunity arose.  Equally, though, there have been acquisitions of other small companies 
which were seen to be cheap, had good assets, and could be improved.  A few new small stores 
have been opened, but lack of investment funds has inhibited large-scale acquisitions.  As the 
head of Human Relations put it, ‘Permira is tight with money’.  Meanwhile, in 2006, Permira 
itself has made two other smaller Spanish acquisitions in retailing: at the time of writing there 
has been no attempt to merge these companies.   
According to both management and labor respondents, DinoSol has been allowed to 
make its own decisions in labor relations, without direct involvement by Permira, though the 
latter has taken a broad overview of strategy.  In terms of employment, around 60 stores and 
offices have been closed or sold, totalling 900 jobs.  However, most of these jobs have passed to 
new owners rather than being lost.  Nevertheless, as one union representative said, ‘This can be 
tough on those who have to transfer – very unsettling’.  Because of growth and some new 
acquisitions, total employment now stands at the same as when the acquisition was made.  Two 
other changes in employment conditions moved the company towards a somewhat stronger 
internal labor market.  First, there has been a movement towards making store staff full-time 
and putting them on open-ended contracts: according to a management interviewee, ‘In the long-
term, we came to believe this is cost-minimising and good for everyone’.  Second, a new pay 
system has been introduced, emphasising merit, performance, and profitability, at both individual 
and group level (Wilke et al., 2009).  
In terms of work organization, some staff (40) have been retrained and redeployed from 
office to store and warehouse work.  Greater control over absenteeism has also been introduced.  
Page 20 of 39
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
   
21 
 
Simultaneously, it would appear that DinoSol has maintained its training facilities, especially for 
skilled workers in food preparation departments (meat and fish), and has extended training to 
other workers. 
In terms of industrial relations, there has been one major development.  The above-
mentioned changes have been brought about under an Employment Plan, agreed with the two 
main unions.  For the first time in DinoSol’s history, this created a company-wide council, with 
four management and four employee representatives.  In turn, the council has formulated policy 
on relocation, protection during transfer, and redundancy terms.  To monitor this, a joint 
committee has operated.  Note that Spanish law supports the election of works councils at the 
workplace, but it is not common for company-wide institutions to operate except where 
collective agreements with unions requires them.  Under the Plan, the membership and presence 
of trade unions has increased and density is now about 12 per cent, high for the retailing sector in 
Spain.  From DinoSol’s point of view, the Employment Plan was said by one manager to be ‘a 
way to avoid collateral damage’.  Permira is reported not to have been directly involved in this 
process, but significantly it has not opposed it.  One of the two main unions commented: ‘we 
got some sort of company-wide representation for the first time ever’. 
In conclusion, the acquisition of DinoSol by Permira was a means whereby the former 
owner exited from a company which had low profitability and needed restructuring.  Permira 
has acted to refinance the deal and to free up cash within the company.  As a result, there has 
been some small job loss (40), a larger number of transfers (463, most but not all with retained 
pay and conditions), and some changes in terms and working conditions.  These changes have 
been consulted over and would seem to have led to an increase in employee voice in the 
company.  On the whole, Permira appears to have acted in a cooperative way towards the labor 
force.  However, it should be noted that the changes occurred largely during a period of 
economic upswing.  Currently, according to the unions, there is uncertainty about the future and 
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a constant fear that the company could be sold.  If the sale is to a competitor, such a firm might 
further restructure the company.  However, in the present difficult economic situation in Spain 
and given the difficulty of finding a good purchaser, Permira may be constrained to hold the 
company for longer than it had anticipated. 
 
--------------------------------  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
 
KUKA: German engineering company, American hedge fund 
Several big HFs, and a larger number of smaller HFs, have been active in Germany over the last 
ten years, and they have attracted considerable critical attention.  Famously, they have been 
labelled ‘locusts’ by politicians and the media (Seifert and Voth, 2006).  The case to which we 
refer here involves a typical German Mittelstand engineering company, KUKA, the American 
HF Wyser-Pratte, and a number of other HFs. 
KUKA is an old-established mechanical and electrical engineering company, with a 
specialism in automotive equipment and industrial robots.  From the 1970s onwards, it was 
merged with another machine tool, packaging machinery, and control technology group, under 
the name of IKWA, and, for many years, was a listed company with widely dispersed ownership.  
The company was profitable, but at a low level, across most of its business activities (Wilke et 
al., 2009). 
Wyser-Pratte was established in 1991 by Guy Wyser-Pratte and is based in New York. 
The fund has concentrated on investing in under-valued companies and has followed an activist 
strategy.  Over the past decade it has focused on European companies, mainly in Germany, 
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where it has attracted considerable public attention.  For example, it was involved in the British 
Vodafone acquisition of Mannesmann, where it was seen as one of the driving forces behind the 
deal, and it took an active position in the large Rheinmetall group, where it pushed 
(unsuccessfully) for a major restructuring programme. 
In common with other activist HFs, Wyser-Pratte’s business model is to search for under-
valued companies, to acquire a significant minority stake (usually less than 5 per cent), and to 
work in combination with other funds.  The objectives are to put pressure on management to 
increase dividends, to initiate share buy-backs, to sell parts of the business, and to change 
company strategy so as to add value.  Sometimes the intervening mechanism is to change the 
top management team.  Usually shares are held until the strategy succeeds and / or a good exit 
opportunity can be found.  Thus, the aim is to increase share price and then sell within a short 
time period, usually under a year.  In our interview with Wyser-Pratte, he reiterated the phrase 
that he has been credited with vis-à-vis the management of investee companies – ‘wake up and 
smell the napalm’. 
Wyser-Pratte first invested in IKWA in 2003 and built up a large 9 per cent holding by 
2007.  The company was well suited to the pursuit of an activist strategy – it was not 
particularly profitable, but was under-valued, showed growth potential, and had a large free float 
of shares.  Wyser-Pratte decided that the potential was primarily in industrial robotics where 
KUKA had been a pioneer.  As the strategy developed, Wyser-Pratte was joined by a number of 
other HFs, with the former acting as a so-called ‘alpha wolf’ in pressing for change at annual 
meetings, in company briefings, and in the press. 
When Wyser-Pratte first became involved, employment in the IKWA group stood at just 
over 13,000, across a broad spread of engineering sectors.  Over the next five years, the 
company sold off numerous parts including its large package machinery subsidiary, leading to a 
reduction in employment by around 7,000 staff.  This was under strong pressure from Wyser-
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Pratte and some other investors, including other HFs.  This restructuring led to considerable 
conflict between investors and IKWA’s board.  In the process, the company was renamed 
KUKA, and did indeed come to concentrate more on industrial robots and systems engineering, 
while remaining dependent on the automotive industry.  In practice, Wyser-Pratte would have 
liked the restructuring to have gone further, with even more concentration on robotics, with the 
aim of making KUKA into the world leader in this sector. 
In the labor relations area, IKWA and then KUKA management have made their 
decisions subject to activist pressure from Wyser-Pratte and other HFs, but with the constraint of 
employee board-level representation, strong works councils, and trade union membership (as is 
common in the German metalworking industry) (Wilke et al., 2009). 
The main change has been in terms of employment, with a reduction of around 7,000 
jobs.  However, there have been few lay-offs or job losses, and most of the reduction has come 
from transfers to new owners.  Interestingly, a majority of these new owners were PE funds who 
bought parts of the business from KUKA.  Unfortunately it has not been possible to ascertain 
what has happened to employment following the sale by KUKA nor what has happened to terms 
and conditions in the new owning companies.  In other words, it is not possible to estimate 
whether there has been a net decrease or increase in jobs.  In interviews, however, KUKA 
management and unions’ views were that there has been no overall job loss.  Similarly, both 
KUKA management and union representatives told us that changes in work and working 
conditions have been normal for the sector.  Moreover, as with all these cases, the 
counterfactual must be taken into account, namely what might have happened in the absence of 
HF activism. 
In terms of industrial relations, union representatives indicated that worker directors and 
works councillors have had little direct dealings with Wyser-Pratte.  However, decisions about 
sales and transfers were communicated to employees, works councillors, and trade union 
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representatives.  Typically for Germany, as members of the company supervisory board, works 
councillors and union representatives were provided with information.  In fact, from interviews 
it would appear that employee representatives and the trade unions accepted some of the general 
logic of restructuring and transfer of employees.  They also played a part in making 
arrangements with management for job guarantees and assurances on pay and conditions.   
The main outcome of the restructuring following the HF intervention has been that 
KUKA is now a much smaller company, specialising in two particular sub-sectors, automotive 
and robotics.  HF activity played a significant part in this restructuring and in the speed of 
divestments.  As one manager said, ‘This may be a good thing, but it certainly involved a fight 
and uncertainty for staff’.  After initial losses in 2005 and 2006, profits increased in 2007, 
though this was a good year generally for the metalworking sector in Germany.  Subsequently, 
in the recession from 2008 onwards, profits have fallen.  The share price rose markedly during 
the restructuring period, but then also fell steeply in 2008, as did the price of other automotive 
stocks.  2009 brought further changes for KUKA, with the German family-owned machine-
building company, Grenzebacher, acquiring 30 per cent of shares and announcing a close 
cooperation between the two companies and a change in KUKA’s management.  However, 
Wyser-Pratte is still invested in KUKA as a good exit opportunity has not been found.   
 
P&O: UK ports and logistics company, Dubai sovereign wealth fund 
The UK has been the most significant country in Europe in terms of investment funds.  It has 
been the main country for PE and HFs (both as headquarters for funds and also as a location for 
their investment).  It has also been a major investment location for SWFs.  The SWF model has 
taken various forms in the UK, ranging from relatively small holdings, to larger holdings on a 
longer term basis, and to some acquisitions of a whole company.  The case of Dubai World / 
Dubai Ports World and P&O falls into the latter category. 
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Dubai World is a Dubai government-owned holding company, under the control of the 
Dubai ruling family.  Under the Dubai World umbrella are the following: Dubai Ports World, 
the investment company Istithmar, the property developer Nakheel, and a number of other 
companies and funds.  Dubai Ports World was created, under Dubai World, to develop Dubai as 
a major transhipment centre and to constitute a global logistics company.  In addition, there is 
the Investment Corporation of Dubai, another family / government investment vehicle.  The 
financial basis of the fund are past oil revenues (now largely depleted), earnings from other 
sources, and borrowings from neighbouring Emirate states, especially oil-rich Abu Dhabi, and 
from world money markets.   
For its part, P&O was an old-established UK shipping and ports operating company, with 
significant world-wide interests.  Its shares were widely dispersed and traded on a number of 
stock exchanges.  Under a number of chief executives, it had diversified into ferries, real estate, 
construction, and other areas, and by the early 1990s was something of a conglomerate.  
However, in the late 1990s, under pressure from institutional investors, it then divested its 
construction, property, cruise, and container businesses.  The company came increasingly to 
concentrate on logistics and port terminals, but it also retained a substantial UK ferry business.  
At the time of the acquisition, it had 22,000 employees worldwide. 
In 2005, a bidding contest for P&O developed between Dubai Ports World and the 
Singapore SWF Temasek.  The former was successful, except that P&O’s North American port 
operations were taken out of the deal, having been blocked by the US government.  Dubai Ports 
World paid a 70 per cent premium on the initial share price and the deal was valued at around 
£4bn.  The acquisition was an all-cash operation, financed with some existing funds, but also 
with significant new borrowings, especially from other Arab states.   
Having acquired P&O, the company was de-listed, headquarters were moved to Dubai, 
and it was clear that key decisions were to be made in Dubai (even though many non-Dubai 
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senior managers were retained).  Subsequently, in late 2007, Dubai Ports World was listed on 
the Dubai stock exchange, with eligibility for 20 per cent of the shares but these being restricted 
to nationals of Gulf states.  Dubai Ports World stated to us that ‘the organization, though owned 
by a single shareholder, the state of Dubai, is run entirely on commercial terms’ and that the ‘the 
P&O acquisition is not a portfolio, but a strategic investment’.  Since then it has acted to 
integrate operations and develop the company as a major logistics operator.   
In the labor area, given the short time period which has elapsed and given a lack of 
transparency, it is difficult to ascertain what has been the effect of the Dubai Ports World 
acquisition.  As one UK union official stated to us, ‘You don’t see them or hear them.  It’s 
almost as though they are not there’.  In practice, the strategy has been to leave labor relations to 
local management.  As another union official stated: ‘We deal with the local people, though 
these are often new; and Dubai Ports World is always there somewhere in the background’ 
In terms of employment relations, there has been little reduction in staffing, though as the 
world economic crisis has continued, this may increase.  However, this might well have taken 
place whoever owned the company, and it is also occurring with other maritime companies 
(Wilke et al. 2009).  There was some fear among the UK unions that Dubai Ports World might 
sell off the ferry part of the company because it does not fit with its core interests and is not 
particularly profitable.  However, to date, the only announcement which has been made is that 
the UK-Spanish ferry will be closed at the end of November 2010.  In another area, Dubai Ports 
World is going ahead with the development of a major new container port at ThamesGateway.  
As one union representative said: ‘so far jobs have been kept, but there’s a new uncertainty with 
this new owner – they’re not as rich as we thought.’ 
In the UK, the unions have expressed some concern as to whether Dubai Ports World will 
meet all its pension obligations to industry schemes.  There is some confusion in this respect 
and legal action is pending.  Thus, the state of pension arrangements is unclear, but, it must be 
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said that deterioration in pension terms had already occurred in the 1990s under P&O ownership.  
Meanwhile, employee share ownership plans operated by P&O were discontinued when Dubai 
Ports World acquired the company. 
In terms of work organization, there is no evidence that there have been changes in 
working practices, involving the structure of jobs and work intensity.  In fact, again, significant 
changes in these areas had already been brought about by P&O in the two decades before 
acquisition.  Again according to the union, ‘changes had taken place earlier: it was a sort of 
sorting out, prior to selling off the company’.  On the other hand, for its part, Dubai Ports World 
makes considerable play of its investment in training.  As one management spokesman said, 
‘Our aim it to develop the company and its key human resources’.  The unions confirmed that it 
continues a good tradition in this area, at least in Europe. 
In terms of industrial relations, under P&O, and now under Dubai Ports World, trade 
unions are recognised in countries such as the UK, the rest of Europe, Australia, North and South 
America, and some other jurisdictions.  However, negotiations are always at a local level and 
P&O has refused company-wide bargaining or consultation.  At the time of the acquisition, 
employees and their representatives were informed, but not consulted, by Dubai Ports World.  
In Europe, there is a European Works Council and the unions have expressed some disquiet that 
Dubai Ports World might be using this to by-pass collective bargaining.  In Dubai, the company 
does not recognise unions and has not entered into new recognition in any countries where such 
did not previously exist under P&O.  At a world-wide level, the unions have been unable to 
establish any dialogue with Dubai Ports World which they would very much like to do.  Again, 
however, to put this in context, the same applied to P&O and also applies to the other major 
global port operators.    
In late 2009, it became apparent that Dubai World had over-extended and over-leveraged 
itself, that debt obligations could not be fully met on time, and a major crisis ensued.  As a 
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result, Dubai-owned enterprises have rescheduled certain debts and have drawn on support from 
its oil-rich neighbor, Abu Dhabi.  To date, there is no real evidence of whether or how this has 
fed through to Dubai Ports World and labor relations, but the case illustrates how new forms of 
ownership can introduce new uncertainties.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
These three cases are illustrative of interventions that are made by each type of investment fund.  
Both the PE and HF acquired under-performing companies and then embarked upon a process of 
restructuring with a view to enhancing performance.  To date, though acquiring the whole 
company, the SWF has been less interventionist, but it has nevertheless started to restructure 
some of the operations of its acquisition.   
In terms of employment relations, these types of restructuring programmes have attracted 
criticism from various parties within Europe and beyond on the grounds that they have adverse 
effects on jobs.  These three cases do indeed show that some operations of target companies 
have been contracted, closed, or divested.  At the same time, where activities have been sold, 
jobs have transferred to new owners.  Thus, the net reduction in employment is less than the 
headline numbers might suggest.  Furthermore, the restructuring process at DinoSol also led to 
further acquisitions and later organic growth which must be set against other earlier losses.  We 
are unable to make a definitive calculation of total job loss or creation, but our cases nevertheless 
show that such assessments require more information than headline employment reductions.  
There are also other factors which need to be considered: in the DinoSol case, for instance, there 
was a shift to longer term employment and greater employment security for those who continued 
to be employed within the firm. The manner in which restructuring is carried out is also likely to 
have a significant impact on employees’ subjective experience of the process and transfers are 
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undoubtedly unsettling for employees.  Individual employee perceptions have been under-
researched in this area and potentially have important consequences for actual human resource 
processes and climate (Boselie and Koewe, 2010). 
In terms of work organization, the cases show little change.  Working practices have 
mainly remained unaltered, though there has been an emphasis on securing improvements in 
efficiency in all cases.  However, this does not seem to have been abnormal for the sector.  
Existing levels of training have been maintained, and even somewhat increased, after the 
intervention of the investment funds. There is some evidence of greater use of high performance 
work practices in one of our cases (Dinosol), and this is consistent with some earlier survey-
based studies (Bacon et al, 2004: Bruining et al, 2005).  One counter-argument to our findings 
is that time lags are important, and that further and more extensive changes may occur after the 
point of observation.  Whilst we cannot rule this out, other research has shown that restructuring 
tends to occur relatively early on (Goergen, O’Sullivan, and Wood, 2010 et al. 2010)   
In the case of industrial relations, the case studies show little change in the companies 
acquired by the HF and SWF, but an important change in the Spanish company acquired by the 
PE firm.  An Employment Plan was negotiated with the trade unions which led to a significant 
enhancement of employee representation.  However, consistent with recent survey evidence 
(Bacon et al, 2010), there was little or no involvement of employees and their representatives at 
the time of the acquisition.  Post-acquisition, statutory and customary rights to information, 
consultation, and codetermination were respected.  Employee representatives have been 
involved in restructuring decisions to the extent that existing regulation and company traditions 
allow.  In the case of the German HF intervention, the legally binding nature of agreements with 
the works council and its typical involvement in the sale of operations played a role in 
influencing employment outcomes.  In the three cases, there is no evidence that restructuring 
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decisions have been forced through against strong opposition from unions or other employee 
representatives.  Equally, however, it is clear that employee representatives have had little or no 
contact with the new owners.  
Our research also has broader implications.  One observation from the case studies is 
that the level of ownership is less important than the objectives of funds, as far as the magnitude 
of labor effects are concerned.  The largest reduction in employment was found in the case of 
the HF intervention which had the smallest ownership stake of the three funds.  This emanates 
from the objective of the HF to extract value for shareholders via a change in corporate strategy 
in a relatively short period of time.  By contrast, the other two types of fund, both with a 
controlling ownership stake, operate on longer time-frames.  Labor effects are less dramatic 
especially in the case of the SWF.  One corollary of the short time-frames of HFs, coupled with 
their strong emphasis on shareholder value, is that they may under-value human capital in the 
company.  By contrast, the time-frames of PE and SWFs tend to be longer, and this may 
generate a greater appreciation of the role of human capital in corporate success. 
HFs have interesting implications for extant corporate governance theory.  The dominant 
view in governance research has been that the propensity for active monitoring, and its 
probability of success, will correlate with the size of ownership stakes (Becht and Mayer, 2001).  
Where ownership stakes are small, passive ownership is likely because of the costs of free-
riding.  Activist HFs belie this, albeit as the exception proving the rule.  They are motivated to 
intervene because they believe the potential benefits of intervention outweigh the costs, and they 
have an impact that is disproportionate to their ownership stake.  Their capacity to exert 
pressure on incumbent managements might be attributed to passivity amongst other investors, 
especially where the latter’s ownership is fragmented (Judge, Gaur, and Muller-Kahle, 2010).  
Incumbent managers have to respond to this shareholder activism because of the threat it may 
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pose to them and their job tenure.  One proposition that might be tested in future research is 
whether the extent of restructuring, and associated effects on employment and labor, is 
influenced by the extent of concentration amongst other shareholders. 
Our cases are also suggestive for assessments of the moderating role of national labor 
regulation.  Previous research has shown that the activities of these investment funds are 
concentrated in countries with relatively low employment protection (Bozkaya and Kerr, 2009).  
The rationale for this is that employment protection will limit the extent of restructuring from 
which funds attempt to generate or transfer value.  However, our German case shows that 
extensive reductions to employment can be made where there is substantial employment 
protection.  Furthermore, this country has the most extensive regulation in the area of worker 
voice and representation, with workers having substantial information and decision rights.  
Whilst it can be dangerous to generalize from one or a small number of cases, our evidence 
nevertheless suggests that regulatory context does not deter funds from making substantial 
changes to employment.  It also contrasts with the suggestion made recently that, in highly 
regulated countries, these funds will avoid investing in firms that require major restructuring 
(Boucly et al, 2009).  Our results are consistent with a recent survey which suggests that PE 
firms adapt to national systems of labor regulation in European countries, and that firms acquired 
by PE investors tend to continue with existing employee voice and representation practices 
(Bacon et al., 2010).  Future research might systematically test the proposition that national 
employment protection and voice regulation has a limited effect on the extent of employment 
and labor relations restructuring, whilst controlling as far as possible for selection effects.   
The fact that national labor regulation does not prevent major reductions in employment 
within target firms has implications for policy and practice.  For those concerned about the 
employment consequences of interventions by this range of funds, greater regulation of the funds 
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themselves (e.g. greater requirements to disclose information) might be more effective than 
further regulation on employment protection (Bacon et al.2010).  It is true that there are some 
loopholes in labor law which might be closed: for instance, workers’ rights to information and 
consultation are not generally triggered by changes in ownership by share transfer.  However, 
recent legislative activity in Europe has concentrated on regulating the funds themselves rather 
than enhancing labor law as such.  The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, 
recently passed by the European Parliament and adopted by the European Council of Ministers, 
requires that PE and HFs managing investments above a certain threshold should disclose more 
information about structure, strategy, and investors.   
A further implication is that there is more ground for cooperation between funds, 
management, and labor than is often thought (Westcott, 2009).  Elements of cooperation were to 
be found in the first two cases, a bargained compromise with unions in the Spanish case and a 
consultative enterprise with a works council and local management in the German case, albeit 
with a trade union in the background.  These would suggest that employee voice, if mobilised, 
can play an important and potentially constructive role in fund interventions.            
Overall, our case study evidence adds to a more balanced view of new investment funds 
which is coming to the fore in the literature.  These funds are neither necessarily ‘angels nor 
demons’ in terms of their impacts on labor in their investee firms (Lutz and Achleitner, 2010).  
Though there are limits to generalization from a small number of case studies, the evidence from 
our cases helps understand the complexity of labor impacts in their wider corporate context.  
The article adds to the emergent literature by highlighting the role and limitations of national 
regulation as a moderating factor on the impacts of various types of investment fund.  It is also 
to be hoped that our results will assist in further developing theory and empirical research on this 
topic.      
Page 33 of 39
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
   
34 
 
TABLE 1. 
 
Case Study Companies and Investment Funds  
 
Name Country 
of origin  Sector 
 
Initial 
Employ 
ment 
Investor 
type 
Name and 
country of 
origin of 
fund 
 
Shares Transaction 
values Sold by 
DinoSol Spain Retail  11,000 PE 
Permira, 
UK 100% 
€895m 
 
Ahold 
Group 
KUKA Germany Engineering  
 
 
13,000 
HF 
Wyser-
Pratte  
US 
9% 
€11m 
 
 
Stock 
market 
P&O UK Logistics 
 
 
22,000 
 
SWF 
Dubai 
Ports 
World 
Dubai 
100% 
and 
then 
80% 
 
$4bn P&O 
 
Notes: employment figures are for 2004/5 
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TABLE 2. 
 
Labor Outcomes 2005 – 2009  
 
Compan
y 
 
Workforce 
consulted in 
acquisition 
 
Net headcount 
employment 
change 
 
 
 
Disposal 
of assets 
and 
employme
nt 
transfer 
 
Significant 
change in 
pay / 
benefits 
Significant change 
in work 
organization 
 
 
Change in 
employee 
‘voice’ and 
representat-
ion 
DinoSol No 
Medium 
reduction 
initially, but 
mainly transfers. 
Then return to 
initial headcount 
because of 
acquisitions and 
growth   
 
 
 
 
 
Medium Small  Small; increase in training 
Yes, 
increase 
 
KUKA   No 
Large reduction 
(around 7,000), 
due to transfers.   
 
 
Large  
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
P&O 
 
No 
 
Small reduction 
 
 
No 
No change 
to core 
benefits but 
employee 
share plans 
discontinued 
 
No 
 
Small 
decrease 
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